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Against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure
MATTHEW PIANALTO
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Truman State University, 100 E. Normal,
Kirksville, MO 63501, USA; e-mail: matthew.pianalto@gmail.com

Hedonists hold that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value and, thus,
that a personÕs well-being is reducible to the amount of pleasure she
experiences.1 One way to challenge hedonism is to contest the claim that
only pleasure is intrinsically valuable; a well-known argument of this
form is found in Robert NozickÕs experience machine thought experiment, which suggests that other things matter to us in addition to ‘‘how
things feel on the inside.’’2 A plausible reading of the notion of
other things mattering to us is to understand this as a way of saying that
other things besides pleasure, or how things feel, have intrinsic value. If
this is correct, then hedonism is mistaken. What goes unchallenged with
this kind of argument is the assumption that pleasure has intrinsic value.
However, the view that pleasure is intrinsically valuable can be challenged
by considering the evolutionary role of pleasure as an experiential signal
that both tracks individual well-being enhancing activity and motivates
an individual to pursue things which contribute to his or her well-being.
These ideas should hold, mutatis mutandis, for pain. Elliott Sober and
David Sloan Wilson have argued that evolutionary psychology provides
grounds for rejecting psychological hedonism.3 However, the argument
we will consider is that reﬂecting upon an evolutionary account of the
emergence of the capacity for pleasurable experiences provides a reminder
of the important relationship pleasures, as a kind, have to other goods,
and thus cannot have their value intrinsically. This is an argument against
normative hedonism. If it is correct, then pleasure has value, but not
intrinsic value, and thus is not the summum bonum. As a result, hedonism,
in its normative sense, fails to provide a plausible conception of
well-being.
Let us consider two ways in which we might deﬁne ‘‘intrinsic value.’’
The ﬁrst way, following Moore, is to claim that something is intrinsically
valuable if and only if it is valuable for its own sake, or in itself, in virtue
of its intrinsic properties, rather than because of its usefulness in attaining
some other good.4 On this conception, something has intrinsic value if its
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total value cannot be reduced to its extrinsic, instrumentally valuable,
properties.
A second way to deﬁne ‘‘intrinsic value,’’ taken, for instance by
Richard Brandt, is to say that something is intrinsically valuable if and
only if it is desirable for its own sake, or intrinsically desirable.5 On this
conception, something has intrinsic value if what makes it desirable
cannot be reduced to its extrinsic properties. It is important to distinguish
between something being desirable for its own sake and something being
desired for its own sake, insofar as it is possible that we might desire
something for its own sake without what we desire actually being worthy
of such desire.
What the two conceptions of intrinsic value share is the idea that
something has intrinsic value if its total value, or desirability, cannot be
reduced to the extrinsic, instrumentally valuable, properties it has. They
diﬀer in that a proponent of the prior conception is not committed to
deﬁning value as a function of desirability; someone might instead, for
example, deﬁne ‘‘intrinsic value’’ as a sui generis property, as G. E. Moore
is sometimes thought to have done in Principia Ethica with respect to
what he took ‘‘good’’ to signify. Pleasure, it would appear, is a plausible
candidate for having the status of intrinsic value on either deﬁnition, since
it seems to be, by its very nature, a positive thing, and we often seem to
desire pleasure for its own sake. That does not imply that pleasure is
desirable, but let us assume that the apparent reasonableness of many of
our actual desires for pleasure makes the intrinsic desirability of pleasure
prima facie plausible.
Let us brieﬂy consider the origin of the experience of pleasure. A
plausible evolutionary account can be roughly set out as follows: pleasurable experiences are a way of motivating an organism to keep doing
what it is doing, or to do things like what it is doing in the future; the
organism receives the experiential reward, because what it is doing contributes to its ﬁtness. Similarly, painful experiences motivate the organism
to quit its current activity and to avoid such things in the future, because
such activities or things lower its ﬁtness. Thus, pleasant experiences
emerged as a way of tracking and signaling resources and behaviors
which contribute to the organismÕs ﬁtness, a large part of which is characterized by its physiological well-being, since an organism that is not
faring well physiologically does not stand as good a chance of successfully
reproducing. For psychologically and socially complex beings such as
ourselves, however, it is reasonable to suppose that in addition to physiological well-being, psychological well-being and social well-being are
also typically essential to our overall evolutionary ﬁtness. On this
account, both pleasant and painful experiences have instrumental value,
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since such experiences serve to track beneﬁcial activity and to motivate an
organism to pursue that which is beneﬁcial and to avoid that which is
not.6 Importantly, from an evolutionary point of view, pleasure has only
instrumental value.
However, it might be objected that this causal account of the origin of
pleasure, which would have us place the usefulness of pleasure in the
service of reproductive ﬁtness, fails to take into account the value that
pleasure has for an agent as a conscious, experiencing being. If the agent
enjoys pleasant experiences, then does this not that suggest that pleasant
experiences have some further value in addition to their instrumental
value? It could then be suggested that even if we put considerations of
ﬁtness aside, and with them the physiological, psychological, and social
well-being which are associated with ﬁtness, the fact that an experience is
enjoyable indicates a further value that the experience has, simply in
virtue of the kind of experience it is, a pleasant experience. Such experiences are preferable to painful experiences, and presumably also preferable to their simple absence; presumably, it is preferable to be having a
pleasant experience than not to be. This preferability seems, on the one
hand, to be something that is due to the intrinsic nature of such experiences, and on the other hand, to be what makes such experiences desirable
in themselves.
Let us focus upon the view that pleasures are intrinsically valuable
because they are intrinsically desirable. The motivation for this view is the
idea that, as a kind, pleasant experiences are preferable to their absence.
They are enjoyable in themselves, and this seems to be true even when
they do not contribute in any clear way to our evolutionary ﬁtness, as
with the pleasure of sex with contraceptives, beer, and cigarettes. As we
have seen, the fact that we happen to desire particular pleasures for their
own sake does not necessarily imply that such pleasures are desirable for
their own sake. But let us focus on the claim that, as a distinct kind,
pleasant experiences are intrinsically desirable. If that can be established,
then a hedonist can solve problems about speciﬁc pleasures that lead to
later pains by saying that while the pleasure itself, as the kind of experience it is, is intrinsically desirable, the means through which some
particular pleasure is achieved are not desirable because they increase the
likelihood of later pains.
The problem with the claim that pleasure is intrinsically desirable has
to do with the fact that our natural attraction to pleasant experiences is
generated by the existence of a fairly stable relationship between things
that produce such experiences and their conduciveness to our ﬁtness. If
pleasant experiences emerged as a way of tracking and signaling things
that are conducive to ﬁtness, which includes, for us, our physiological,
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psychological, and social well-being, then, from this perspective, pleasant
experiences are instrumentally valuable because of what they track. Even
if we are not particularly concerned with our evolutionary ﬁtness, it is
reasonable to assume that we are concerned about our physiological,
psychological, and social well-being. Someone might then say that what
justiﬁes our concern with these dimensions of well-being is that faring well
along them increases the likelihood of overall pleasure. In fact, this is
what hedonists must say. But the reasoning then becomes circular: we are
naturally conﬁgured to desire pleasant experiences, because they contribute to our physiological, psychological, and social well-being, and we
desire faring well along these dimensions because doing so is likely to
contribute to our overall pleasure. To break the circle, and to explain
which goods have the more fundamental value, the hedonist then
adds that we desire pleasure for its own sake, because it is intrinsically
desirable.
But if we are conﬁgured to desire pleasure, then to say that pleasure is
intrinsically desirable can mean nothing more than that we ﬁnd pleasure
desirable, because that is the way we are conﬁgured. However, we are
conﬁgured that way for a reason, and it is not because pleasure is
intrinsically desirable, but because pleasure emerged as a means for
tracking things that are conducive to our ﬁtness, and our physiological,
psychological, and social well-being. This is not entirely correct, evolutionarily speaking, since we may be conﬁgured to make certain kinds of
self-sacriﬁces in the interest of our genetic legacy. Let us assume that such
self-sacriﬁces are exceptional cases, since typically a human being must be
faring well physiologically, psychologically, and socially in order to pass
on its genes. Let us also assume that physiological, psychological, and
social well-being are themselves desirable goods, not just because of their
role in evolutionary ﬁtness, but more importantly because they seem to be
reasonable grounds for assessing the quality of a personÕs life. Presumably, even a hedonist can accept this stipulation.
If pleasure emerged as a way of tracking ﬁtness via physiological,
psychological, and social well-being, we can say that typically, and by
proxy, pleasant experiences track these forms of well-being. Since, as has
been assumed, these forms of well-being are themselves desirable, then
pleasant experiences seem to derive their desirability from the good things
which they track. This implies that the desirability of pleasant experiences
as a kind depends upon their stable relationship to things and activities
that are conducive to these forms of well-being. It appears, then, that
pleasure has only instrumental value.
The issue here is not whether pleasure is desirable, but whether it is
intrinsically desirable. The desirability of pleasure cannot be intrinsic
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because its desirability is dependent upon the relationship between
pleasant experiences and things that are conducive to physiological,
psychological, and social well-being. Since the connection between pleasure and that which is conducive to these forms of well-being is a relational, and contingent, feature of pleasure, this is necessarily an extrinsic
property of pleasure. Thus, it is possible that pleasure as a kind might
have been stably associated with things that are not conducive to these
forms of well-being. Since pleasant experiences motivate us to pursue
things that provide such experiences, the pursuit of such pleasantries
would lead to an early grave. This is not something that any normal
person desires or would think desirable under normal circumstances.
Thus, if pleasures, as a kind, were not reliably connected to things that are
conducive to these forms of well-being, it would be quite implausible to
claim that the experiences themselves are intrinsically desirable, even if
beings conﬁgured to desire such pleasures could not but help desiring and
pursuing them. In a well-known experiment by James Olds and Peter
Milner in which rats repeatedly pressed a lever to stimulate the pleasure
centers in their brains, the rats desired the pleasure, but it seems reasonable to claim that the pleasure is not really desirable, because it
motivated the rats to engage in a behavior that, if continued indeﬁnitely
and to the neglect of nutriment, would lead to their demise.7
A hedonist might respond, in the case of the experiment by Olds and
Milner, that while the eﬀects of the particular way of pursuing pleasure is
negative, this does not imply that the particular pleasure itself, considered
in itself regardless of its causes or consequences, is not intrinsically
valuable. But we are supposed to be considering pleasure as a kind, rather
than any particular pleasure. If it turned out that all pleasures were
reliably associated with things that thwart the forms of well-being at issue,
we would see clearly that pleasures are not intrinsically desirable, because
it is entirely unclear how something which reliably thwarts our well-being
along the dimensions we have considered could still somehow make an
independent contribution to our well-being in some other sense. This is a
distinctive problem for a hedonist who claims that pleasure is the only
thing of intrinsic value, because the claim is supposed to support the
hedonist view that we can analyze well-being in terms of aggregated
pleasure. But if the general pursuit of pleasure posed a serious threat to
the livelihood of an individual, which is the locus of this aggregation, then
hedonism would be absurd. That hedonism does not seem absurd in the
real world is due to the fact that pleasure, as a kind, is not linked to these
sorts of things. However, the fact that the value of pleasure seems to
depend on the nature of its source seems to show that the prospects for
pleasure being intrinsically valuable, rather than simply valuable, are dim.
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Since the desirability of pleasure depends upon an appropriate link to
something beyond the pleasure itself, it is clear that its desirability is not
intrinsic. Since the prospect of pleasure is a deeply motivating force, we
are fortunate to the extent that pleasures are linked to things that are
conducive to the other forms of well-being. If the link had been otherwise,
our craving for pleasure would have been such as to put us more often
into dire straits. In a land of plenty, our craving for pleasure often does
just this. This is where we have to take note of the fact that the conditions
of modern living, and the resources available to indivduals living in
aﬄuent societies, diﬀer greatly from the conditions of the ancestral
environment, where resources were either scarce or diﬃcult to attain, and
thus where the risk of gorging ourselves on resources to the point of harm
was less likely to occur.
Someone might again raise the objection based upon the enjoyableness
of pleasures from an agentÕs perspective, and argue that this type of
simple enjoyment indicates a value that pleasure has which is additional
to the value it derives from tracking and signaling behavior that is conducive to these other forms of well-being. However, the point of this
argument is not to show that pleasures are not valuable or desirable, but
only that their value or desirability is not intrinsic. The enjoyment of
harmless pleasures is desirable and not simply desired, because such
enjoyments contribute to the other forms of well-being already mentioned. The enjoyment of our life and activities is an important component of psychological well-being; furthermore, to the extent that
enjoyment contributes to psychological ﬂourishing, it also likely has some
eﬀect on our physiological well-being. Recent research suggests signiﬁcant
relationships between positive aﬀect, in which we can include aggregated
experiences of pleasure, and various indicators of physical health.8 In
addition, people who partake of such pleasures tend to be enjoyable to be
around and show us how to appreciate life in its many details. Enjoyment
is a contributor to our well-being, but not the foundation of it.
If pleasure is but one of many desirable things, and its desirability must
be accounted for in terms of its relationship to other things of value, then
there is no reason to claim that the value it has is intrinsic value. But
hedonists seem committed to the claim that pleasure is not simply valuable, but intrinsically valuable. If a hedonist attempted to drop the adverb
‘‘intrinsically,’’ and to claim that pleasure is the only thing that is valuable, that would seem implausible. The foregoing argument may actually
point to a deeper problem with the very notion of intrinsic value and the
thought that anything of value, or anything worthy of desire, can be
isolated and articulated without bringing into discussion a whole web of
values, needs, and interests that allow us to put any particular claim to
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value into context.9 Thus, if a more general argument against the
coherence of the very notion of intrinsic value can be provided, then the
particular arguments oﬀered here against hedonism will prove to be
unnecessary. In this respect, the foregoing arguments may be regarded as
a case study in the diﬃculties in a common application of the notion of
intrinsic value, one of which is a problem of how we are to appraise the
value of a thing or state, in this case pleasure, in itself.10
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